In Lebanon, the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah has been extended multiple times, most recently by 45 days. However, sporadic violence persists, and Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon, including a deadly May 19th attack in Nabatieh that killed 21 people, have pushed the death toll since March past 3,000. Hezbollah continues limited rocket and drone operations, while Israeli forces maintain a presence along a “yellow line” encompassing around 55 southern villages, where ground engagements, such as the recent defense of Haddatha, highlight the fragility of the truce.

Gaza faces renewed fears of escalation as Hamas disarmament talks stall, and intermittent Israeli strikes on targets in central areas like Nuseirat and Bureij continue despite the broader regional ceasefire, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

 

Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, reportedly conducted quiet, supportive strikes during the Iran campaign, where Iranian proxy networks are degraded but show signs of rapid rebuilding, with IRGC leveraging Hormuz control as a key bargaining chip in ongoing talks.

The Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen largely scaled back Red Sea shipping attacks following the October 2025 Gaza ceasefire but resumed limited operations against Israel in March 2026 in solidarity during the Iran war. Missile and drone launches targeted Israeli sites, though no major resumption of broad maritime disruptions has occurred recently. Houthi leaders have praised the Iran ceasefire as a “victory” while warning of future escalations if Israel or the US target the “Axis of Resistance”.

 

Houthis maintain a rapid-redeployment capability for the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb threats, with coastal missile infrastructure intact. Coordination with a weakened Iran is strained, but economic pressures in Houthi-controlled areas are boosting recruitment. Internally, the Houthis retain firm control over northern Yemen, with ongoing tensions in the south involving Saudi/UAE-backed factions like the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Limited prisoner swaps continue under UN facilitation, but broader political progress remains stalled - with a no-safe-rehabilitation plan forecasted for the ordinary Hormuz flows.

 

In Sudan, the civil war between SAF and RSF enters its fourth year with no resolution in sight, spilling across the border into Chad, destabilising the country and threatening its government. Drone strikes, urban fighting, and famine/genocide-level humanitarian catastrophe affect tens of millions, with displacement and aid needs escalating. While in Myanmar, the resistance forces (PDFs and ethnic armed organisations) continue eroding Tatmadaw control across much of the country. The junta's attempts at legitimisation through controlled elections have failed to quell widespread conflict and territorial losses. 

 

Persistent insurgencies and governance breakdowns in the Sahel continue to drive hybrid threats and migration pressures, as in Mali. Jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel have reached a dangerous new phase, marked by sophisticated coordination and territorial gains. In late April 2026, al-Qaeda-linked Jama’ at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front launched nationwide attacks in Mali, killing Defense Minister Sadio Camara, overrunning bases near Tessalit, and forcing Russian/Wagner withdrawals from northern positions. 

Similar jihadist gains persist in Burkina Faso and Niger, with expanding cross-border operations through violence spilling across borders with JNIM expanding southward. Technological defense strategies centre on drone ISR/strikes (Turkish/Chinese systems) and AI predictive tools by state forces, countered by insurgents’ growing use of commercial drones with AI-visual navigation that evades jamming. Weak governance and ineffective security responses have allowed armed groups to expand, and neighbouring areas such as north-western Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin are also affected by militant activity and humanitarian crises.

What began as a security response, closing the border with Sudan, has evolved into a far broader challenge, representing an existential threat to Chad’s stability and to President Mahamat Idriss Déby’s hold on power. The conflict is rapidly metastasising, with serious consequences not only for Chad but also for the wider region, including the AES-CEN-SAD countries.

 

This “autonomy pivot” favours hard-kill countermeasures and offline AI capabilities, as these dynamics displace millions, fuel famine and trafficking networks, and risk spillover into coastal West Africa, amplifying migration flows toward Europe. Long-term containment demands integrated tech-human strategies alongside governance fixes. Pragmatic JNIM-Tuareg alliances, despite ideological clashes, reflect shared anti-junta goals and could accelerate fragmentation. Russian forces show signs of logistical strain, with drone-enabled jihadist tactics proving increasingly effective against conventional positions.

 

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda-backed M23 rebels continue to consolidate control over much of North Kivu, including Goma, despite fragile ceasefire attempts under the Washington Accords and Qatar-mediated talks. Recent US diplomatic pressure prompted limited M23 withdrawals from some positions, but fighting with FARDC forces persists. M23 has built parallel governance structures, recruited locally, and secured revenue from mineral-rich areas. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an ISIS affiliate, expands in adjacent regions, worsening the humanitarian disaster with mass displacement and atrocities.

Mineral economies fundamentally drive the conflict, with M23 generating substantial monthly income from its control of mines (US interests in critical minerals create mixed incentives regarding pressure on Rwanda) - forecasts see permanent territorial fracture risks remain high if parallel administrations solidify.